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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The

Appellant's

sentencing

on

March

24,

1989,

conducted

pursuant to Babbel 1, 770 P.2d 987 (Utah 1989) was not a "nunc pro
tunc act".

The trial court erred by declining to consider the

Appellant's exemplary record at the prison since the date of his
conviction.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY
REFUSING TO CONSIDER THE APPELLANT'S EXEMPLARY
PRISON RECORD AS A MITIGATING FACTOR AT HIS
SENTENCING HEARING.
The sentences imposed by the trial court at the original
sentencing hearing were illegal because they did not comply with
U.C.A. § 76-5-405 and U.C.A. § 76-5-302.

For that reason, this

Court, in Babbel I, vacated the illegal sentences and remanded the
case for re-sentencing.
The State, in its responsive brief has endeavored to justify
the exclusion of the mitigating prison performance evidence by
advancing a nunc pro tunc

argument.

However, the State has cited

no authority in support of this argument.

Rules of appellate

advocacy dictate that the State's argument should be dismissed for
this reason alone.

(A brief on appeal must contain some support

for each contention).

State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah

1989); (an appellate court will not engage in constructing argu1

ments out of a whole cloth).

State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239,

1247 n.5 (Utah 1988); (the Court declined to rule on a constitutional claim unsupported by legal analysis or authority).
v. Ami cone, 689 P.2d

State

1341 (Utah 1984); also see Utah Rules of

Appellate Procedure 24(a).
Notwithstanding

the

State's

briefing

error,

the

State's

argument fails because the entry of the judgment following the
sentencing hearing on March 24, 1989, was not a nunc pro tunc act.
A Nunc Pro Tunc Order may be entered to reflect something which was
actually done by the Court; however, this device may not be used
to supply an omission in the record, i.e. for something which was
not done.

This Court has stated that "[a] motion nunc pro tunc is

used to make the record speak the truth: it may not be used to
correct the Court's failure to speak."
298, 299 (Utah 1984).

Preece v. Preece, 682 P.2d

(The function of the entry of a Nunc Pro

Tunc Order is the correction of judicial records insofar as they
fail to record, or improperly record, a judgment rendered by the
Court, as distinguished from the correction of an error in the
judgment itself or in the failure to render the judgment). DuPonte
v. DuPonte, 53 Haw. 123, 488 P.2d 537 (1971); (the purpose of a
Nunc Pro Tunc Order is to provide a means of entering the actual
judgment of the trial court which for one reason or another was not
properly recorded).

Wallace v. Wallace, 214 Kan. 344, 520 P.2d
2

1221 (1974);

(nunc pro tunc has reference to the making of an

entry now, of something which was actually previously done,, so as
to have it effective as of the earlier date; it is not to be used
to supply some omitted action of the court or counsel, but may be
utilized to supply an omission in the record of something really
done but omitted through mistake or advertence). Mora v. Martinez,
80 N.M. 88, 451 P. 2d 992 (1969); (although a trial court by an
Order Nunc Pro Tunc may correct the record judgment theretofore,
it may not, by such an Order, render another or different judgment
as one which it intended to render but did not).

Humphrey Oil

Corp. v. Lindsey, 370 P.2d 296 (Okla. 1961).
CONCLUSION
The challenged sentencing hearing was not a nunc pro tunc act.
The proffered mitigation evidence was relevant and the trial judge
was duty bound to consider all of the Appellant's circumstances on
the day that he stood before the Judge for imposition of sentence.
Both

due

process

76-3-201(5)(c)

and

mandate

a

common

the

sense

consideration

exemplary behavior while incarcerated.

3

reading
of

of

the

U.C.A.

§

Appellant's

The trial court's failure

to consider this evidence constitutes an abuse of discretion and
necessitates a remand for an additional sentencing hearing.
DATED this

I ff

day of

SK yJLn,

HA

1991,

<

*

-

•

WALTER F. BUGDEN, JR
Attorney for Appellant
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PUNISHMENTS

76-3-201

(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an installment
basis or on other conditions to be fixed by the court;
(iii) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment of
restitution and the method of payment; and
(iv) other circumstances which the court determines make restitution inappropriate.
(c) If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of
the restitution, the court shall at the time of sentencing allow him a full
hearing on the issue.
(4) As used in Subsection (3):
(a) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which the defendant is
convicted or any other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits
responsibility to the sentencing court with or without an admission of
committing the criminal conduct.
(b) "Pecuniary damages" means all special damages, but not general
damages, which a person could recover against the defendant in a civil
action arising out of the facts or events constituting the defendant's criminal activities and includes, but is not limited to, the money equivalent of
property taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses such
as earnings and medical expenses.
(c) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary
damages to a victim, including insured damages.
(d) "Victim" means any person whom the court determines has suffered
pecuniary damages as a result of the defendant's criminal activities. "Victim" does not include any coparticipant in the defendant's criminal activities.
(5) (a) If a statute under which the defendant was convicted mandates that
one of three stated minimum terms shall be imposed, the court shall order
imposition of the term of middle severity unless there are circumstances
in aggravation or mitigation of the crime.
(b) Prior to or at the time of sentencing, either party may submit a
statement identifying circumstances in aggravation or mitigation, or presenting additional facts. If the statement is in writing, it shall be filed
with the court and served on the opposing party at least four days prior to
the time set for sentencing.
(c) In determining if circumstances exist that justify imposition of the
highest or lowest term, the court may consider the record in the case, the
probation officer's report, other reports, including reports received under
Section 76-3-404, statements in aggravation or mitigation submitted by
the prosecution or the defendant, and any further evidence introduced at
the sentencing hearing.
(d) The court shall set forth on the record the facts supporting and
reasons for imposing the upper or lower term.
(e) The court in determining a just sentence shall consider sentencing
guidelines regarding aggravation and mitigation promulgated by the
Commission on Criminal and Juvenile Justice.
(6) (a) If a defendant subject to Subsection (5) has been sentenced and committed to the Utah State Prison the court may, within 120 days of the
date of commitment on its own motion, or at any time upon the recommendation of the Board of Pardons, recall the sentence and commitment
previously ordered and resentence the defendant in the same manner as if
9

ASHTON, BRAUNBERGER, POULSEN & BOUD, P.C.
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
302 West 5400 South
Suite 103
Murray, Utah 84107

:hard I. Ashton
tyne H. Braunberger
bert J. Poulsen
nes R. Boud
idley R. Jones*
vid A. Wilde

Facsimile
(801) 263-0338

censed also in
.ho and Nebraska

June 24, 1991

Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk
Utah Supreme Court
332 State Capital
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
RE:

Telephone
(801) 263-0300

F I L E D
JUN 2 7 fOQf
CLERK SUPREME COURT
UTAH

J.H. vs. West Valley Cityf et al.
Appeal No. 900052

Dear Mr. Butler:
By letter of June 14, 1991, Allan Larson, Counsel for West
Valley City, alerted the court to three cases: D.T. v. Independent
School District, 894 F.2d 1176 (10th Cir. 1990); Thomas v. Cannon,
751 F.Supp. 765 (N.N.D. 111. 1990); and Johnson v. Rogers, 763 P.2d
771 (Utah 1988).
The Johnson v. Rogers case was discussed during oral argument
of this matter, and need not be discussed any further at this time.
The Thomas v. Cannon case involves a bus driver, not a police
officer. Furthermore, the driver was employed by a private agency
which had contracted with the city, a much more tenuous relationship than the relationship of Officer Lyday to West Valley City.
The D.T. v. Independent School District case deals with a
school teacher who allegedly molested students in conjunction with
activities at a summer basketball camp conducted by the school
teacher. The court in that case made a point of observing that the
teacher "... was under no obligation to the school district. He
was then on his free or summer vacation. As such, he had no duties
or obligations owing to or functions to perform for the school
district." (894 F.2d 1186. See also further discussion of this
issue on subsequent pages.)
The court also specifically
distinguished the school teacher from a police officer case, even
an "off-duty" police officer. (Id. at 1188.)
Sincerely,
ASHTON, BRAUNBERGER, POULSEN
& BOUD, P.C.
BY
)avid A. Wilde
David
DAW/hyo

